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Table of Contents

  • Cover

  • Title Page

  • Copyright Page

  • General Preface

  • Contents

  • Preface

  • Contributors

  • Les Liaisons Dangereuses

  • Acknowledgements

  • Realism and Anti-Realism in Mathematics

  • 1 A Survey of Positions

  • 1.1 Mathematical Realism

  • 1.1.1 Anti-platonistic realism (physicalism and psychologism)

  • 1.1.2 Mathematical platonism

  • 1.2 Mathematical Anti-Realism

  • 2 Critique of the Various Views

  • 2.1 Critique of Platonism

  • 2.1.1 The Epistemological Argument Against Platonism

  • 2.1.2 The Non-Uniqueness Objection to Platonism

  • 2.1.3 Responses to Some Recent Objections to FBP-NUP

  • 2.2 Critique of Anti-Platonism

  • 2.2.1 Introduction: The Fregean Argument Against Anti-Platonism

  • 2.2.2 Critique of Non-Fictionalistic Versions of Anti-Realistic Anti-Platonism

  • 2.2.3 Critique of Realistic Anti-Platonism (i.e., Physicalism and Psychologism)

  • 2.2.4 Indispensability

  • 2.3 Critique of Platonism Revisited: Ockham's Razor

  • 3 Conclusions: The Unsolvability of the Problem and a Kinder, Gentler Positivism

  • 3.1 The Strong Epistemic Conclusion

  • 3.2 The Metaphysical Conclusion

  • 3.3 My Official View

  • Bibliography

  • Aristotelian Realism

  • 1 Introduction

  • 2 The Aristotelian Realist Point of View

  • 3 Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure

  • 4 Necessary Truths About Reality

  • 5 The Formal Sciences

  • 6 Comparison with Platonism and Nominalism

  • 7 Epistemology

  • 8 Experimental Mathematics and Evidence for Conjectures

  • 9 Conclusion

  • Bibliography

  • Empiricism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

  • 1 Introduction

  • 2 Aristotle

  • 3 John Stuart Mill

  • 3.1 Mill on geometry

  • Appendix: non-Euclidean geometry

  • 3.2 Mill on arithmetic

  • 4 Mill's Modern Supporters

  • 4.1 Kitcher against apriorism

  • 4.2 Kitcher on arithmetic

  • 4.3 Maddy on arithmetic

  • 5 Quine, Putnam and Field

  • 5.1 The indispensability of mathematics

  • 5.2 How much mathematics is indispensable?

  • 5.3 Digression: Nominalism

  • 5.4 Doing Without Numbers

  • 6 Logic and Analysis

  • 6.1 Analysis

  • 6.2 Logic

  • 6.3 Coda

  • Bibliography

  • A Kantian Perspective on the Philosophy of Mathematics

  • 1 Mathematics, Science of Forms

  • 2 Individual Objects — Why Mathematics Cannot Be Reduced to Logic

  • 3 Formal Rules — Why Mathematics Cannot Be Reduced to Manipulation of Marks on Paper

  • 4 Rules and Forms of Representation — Hilbertian Formalism

  • 5 Axiomatization and Structures — Changing the Object of Mathematics

  • 6 Does Set Theory Provide a Pure Theory of Manifolds?

  • 7 Ordinal, Cardinal and Two Kinds of Infinite

  • 8 Intuition and the Theory of Pure Manifolds

  • 9 Manifolds as Aggregates

  • 9.1 Aggregates as Manifolds

  • 10 Maxima, Minima — Totalities and Quantifiers

  • 11 What Is a Kantian Approach?

  • Appendix

  • A Non-Euclidean Geometry and Einstein's Relativity Theories

  • Bibliography

  • Logicism

  • 1 What Is Logicism?

  • 2 What Is Mathematics?

  • 3 What Is the Logic of Logicism?

  • 4 Frege the First Logicist

  • 5 Frege's Logic of Quantifiers

  • 6 Defining Real Numbers

  • 7 Frege's Higher-Order Logic

  • 8 Axiomatic Set Theory vs. Logicism

  • 9 Principia Mathematica and its Aftermath

  • 10 Logicism vs. Metamathematics

  • 11 The Transformation of Logicism

  • 12 Correcting Frege's Theory of Quantification

  • 13 Reduction to the First-Order Level

  • 14 Logicism Vindicated?

  • Bibliography

  • Formalism

  • 1 Preliminaries

  • 1.1 Problem of Definition

  • 1.2 Hilbert

  • 1.3 Working Mathematicians

  • 2 The Old Formalism and its Refutation

  • 2.1 Contentless Manipulation

  • 2.2 Frege's Critique

  • 3 The New Axiomatics

  • 3.1 Hilbert's Grundlagen

  • 3.2 Implicit Definition and Contextual Meaning

  • 3.3 Dispute with Frege

  • 3.4 The Axioms of Real Numbers

  • 4 The Crisis of Content

  • 4.1 Logicism's Waterloo and other Paradoxes

  • 4.2 Self-Restriction

  • 5 The Classical Period

  • 5.1 Preparations

  • 5.2 Hilbert's Maximal Conservatism

  • 5.3 Finitism

  • 5.4 Syntacticism and Meaning

  • 6 Gödel's Bombshell

  • 7 The Legacy of Formalism

  • 7.1 Proof Theory

  • 7.2 Consistency Proofs

  • 7.3 Bourbakism

  • 8 Conclusion

  • Bibliography

  • Constructivism in Mathematics

  • 1 Introduction: Varieties of Constructivism

  • 1.1 Crucial Statements

  • 1.2 Appropriateness

  • 1.3 Constructions

  • 1.4 Constructive Logics and Proof Conditions

  • 1.5 Formalizations of Constructive Logic and Mathematics

  • 2 Constructivism in the 19th Century: du Bois-Reymond and Kronecker

  • 2.1 Paul du Bois-Reymond

  • 2.2 Leopold Kronecker

  • 3 Intuitionism and L. E. J. Brouwer

  • 4 Heyting and Formal Intuitionistic Logic

  • 5 Markovian or Russian Constructivism

  • 6 Bishop's New Constructivism

  • 7 Predicativism

  • 8 Finitism

  • Bibliography

  • Fictionalism

  • 1 Kinds of Fictionalism

  • 1.1 Truth

  • 1.2 Interpretation

  • 1.3 Elimination

  • 2 Motivations for Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics

  • 2.1 Benacerraf's Dilemma

  • 2.2 Yablo's Comparative Advantage Argument

  • 3 A Brief History of Fictionalism

  • 3.1 William of Ockham: Reductive Fictionalism

  • 3.2 Jeremy Bentham: Instrumentalist Fictionalism

  • 3.3 C. S. Peirce: Representational Fictionalism

  • 3.4 Hans Vaihinger: Free-range Fictionalism

  • 4 Science Without Numbers

  • 5 Balaguer's Fictionalism

  • 6 Yablo's Figuralism

  • 7 Semantic Strategies

  • 7.1 Truth in a Fiction

  • 7.2 Constructive Free-range Fictionalism

  • 7.3 Definitions

  • 7.4 Settled Models

  • 7.5 Minervan Constructions

  • 7.6 Marsupial Constructions

  • 7.7 Open Models

  • 7.8 Modal Translations

  • Bibliography

  • Set Theory from Cantor to Cohen

  • 1 Cantor

  • 1.1 Real Numbers and Countability

  • 1.2 Continuum Hypothesis and Transfinite Numbers

  • 1.3 Diagonalization and Cardinal Numbers

  • 2 Mathematization

  • 2.1 Axiom of Choice and Axiomatization

  • 2.2 Logic and Paradox

  • 2.3 Measure, Category, and Borel Hierarchy

  • 2.4 Hausdorff and Functions

  • 2.5 Analytic and Projective Sets

  • 2.6 Equivalences and Consequences

  • 3 Consolidation

  • 3.1 Ordinals and Replacement

  • 3.2 Well-Foundedness and the Cumulative Hierarchy

  • 3.3 First-Order Logic and Extensionalization

  • 3.4 Relative Consistency

  • 3.5 Combinatorics

  • 3.6 Model-Theoretic Methods

  • 4 Independence

  • 4.1 Forcing

  • 4.2 Envoi

  • Acknowledgements

  • Bibliography

  • Alternative Set Theories

  • Introduction

  • Part I: Topological Solutions to the Fregean Problem

  • 1 The Naïve Notion of Set

  • 2 The Abstraction Process

  • 3 Sets and Membership

  • 4 First-Order Versions

  • 5 Russell's Paradox

  • 6 Solution Routes

  • 7 Frege Structure

  • 8 The Limitation of Size Doctrine

  • 9 Adding Structure

  • 10 Topology and Indiscernibility

  • 11 Indiscernibility as a Lightning Discharger (?)

  • Part II: Partial, Paradoxical and Double Sets

  • 12 Introduction

  • 13 Partial Sets

  • 14 Positive Sets

  • 15 Paradoxical Sets

  • 16 Double Sets

  • Part III: Proximity Spaces of Exact Sets

  • 17 Introduction

  • 18 Towards Modal Set Theory

  • 19 Proximity Structures

  • 20 Proximal Frege Structures

  • 21 The Ortholattice of Exact Sets

  • 22 Models of PFS

  • 23 On the Discernibility of the Disjoint

  • 24 Plenitude

  • 25 Conclusion

  • Bibliography

  • Philosophies of Probability

  • 1 Introduction

  • Part I: Frameworks for Probability

  • 2 Variables

  • 3 Events

  • 4 Sentences

  • Part II: Interpretations of Probability

  • 5 Interpretations and Distinctions

  • 6 Frequency

  • 7 Propensity

  • 8 Chance

  • 9 Bayesianism

  • 10 Chance as Ultimate Belief

  • 11 Applying Probability

  • Part III: Objective Bayesianism

  • 12 Subjective and Objective Bayesianism

  • 13 Objective Bayesianism Outlined

  • 14 Challenges

  • 15 Motivation

  • 16 Language Dependence

  • 17 Computation

  • 18 Qualitative Knowledge

  • 19 Infinite Domains

  • 20 Fully Objective Probability

  • 21 Probability Logic

  • Part IV: Implications for the Philosophy of Mathematics

  • 22 The Role of Interpretation

  • 23 The Epistemic View of Mathematics

  • 24 Conclusion

  • Acknowledgements

  • Bibliography

  • On Computability

  • 1 Introduction

  • 1.1 Foundational contexts

  • 1.2 Overview

  • 1.3 Connections

  • 2 Decidability and Calculability

  • 2.1 Decidability

  • 2.2 Finitist mathematics

  • 2.3 (Primitive) Recursion

  • 2.4 Formalizability and calculability

  • 3 Recursiveness and Church's Thesis

  • 3.1 Relative consistency

  • 3.2 Uniform calculations

  • 3.3 Elementary steps

  • 3.4 Absoluteness

  • 3.5 Reckonable functions

  • 4 Computations and Combinatory Processes

  • 4.1 Machines and workers

  • 4.2 Mechanical computors

  • 4.3 Turing's central thesis

  • 4.4 Stronger theses

  • 4.5 Machine computability

  • 5 Axioms for Computability

  • 5.1 Discrete dynamical systems

  • 5.2 Gandy machines

  • 5.3 Global assembly

  • 5.4 Models

  • 5.5 Tieferlegung

  • 6 Outlook on Machines and Mind

  • 6.1 Mechanical computability

  • 6.2 Beyond calculation

  • 6.3 Beyond discipline

  • 6.4 (Supra-) Mechanical devices

  • Acknowledgments

  • Bibliography

  • Inconsistent Mathematics: Some Philosophical Implications

  • 1 Introduction: The Paradoxes

  • 2 The Role of Logic

  • 3 Pure Mathematics

  • 4 Geometry

  • 5 Applied Mathematics

  • 6 Logicism and Foundationalism Revisited

  • 7 Revisionism and Duality

  • 8 The Role of Text

  • 9 Conclusions

  • Bibliography

  • Mathematics and the World

  • 1 The Indispensability Argument

  • 1.1 Realism and Anti-realism in Mathematics

  • 1.2 Indispensability Arguments

  • 2 What Is it to Be Indispensable?

  • 3 Naturalism and Holism

  • 3.1 Introducing Naturalism

  • 3.2 Quinean Naturalism

  • 3.3 Holism

  • 3.4 The First Premise Revisited

  • 4 The Hard Road to Nominalism: Field's Project

  • 4.1 Science without Numbers

  • 5 The Easy Road to Nominalism: Rejecting Holism

  • 5.1 Maddy

  • 5.2 Sober

  • 6 The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics

  • 6.1 What is the Puzzle?

  • 6.2 Is the Puzzle Due to a Particular Philosophy of Mathematics?

  • 7 Applied Mathematics: The Philosophical Lessons and Future Directions

  • Bibliography

  • Index

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